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 As one of about eight countries that supply nuclear materials and equipment for 
nuclear energy development to the rest of the world, the United States also requires some 
of the most stringent nonproliferation measures of its prospective clients. In 2009, the 
United States signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). Under the terms of the agreement, the UAE foreswore developing sensitive fuel 
cycle technologies on its own soil in exchange for the ability to receive U.S.-origin 
materials and equipment. The Kingdom of Jordan is also seeking to develop a nuclear 
energy program in the face of its growing energy needs. However, it has refused to sign 
an agreement with the same restrictive terms as the UAE’s. This thesis seeks to 
understand why the UAE has signed an agreement while Jordan has not. It argues that the 
driver of the different outcomes is the two countries’ respective power positions in the 
international system. This preliminary result seems to imply that contrary to some 
vigorous arguments in the U.S. policymaking community, the U.S. will have less 
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Chapter One: Jordan’s and the UAE’s divergent choices for nuclear cooperation with the 
United States  
 
Introduction  
 As countries around the world seek to meet growing energy demand with nuclear 
power, a corresponding question is whether the international nuclear nonproliferation 
regime can meet the challenges associated with technology diffusion. Suppliers of 
nuclear technologies must decide whether they are willing to engage in trade that would 
allow non-nuclear countries to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle, a prospect that would 
also necessarily afford them the technologies to make nuclear weapons. For its part, the 
United States, has one of the most restrictive export regimes, requiring its prospective 
customers to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement (NCA). Among other things, NCAs 
restrict U.S.-origin “special nuclear material”
1
 from being enriched or reprocessed 
without prior approval.
2
 Uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, done at the 
front and back ends of the nuclear fuel cycle, respectively, are processes that are 
necessary to make a nuclear bomb; they are particularly troublesome from a proliferation 
standpoint because countries that seek to make nuclear weapons can use these 
technologies to cover up diversion of materials to a clandestine weaponization program.  
U.S. NCAs do not guarantee trade; they simply allow for transfer of U.S. nuclear 
materials to occur with other countries under U.S. law. 
                                                 
1 U.S. Library of Congress, CRS, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by Mary Beth Nikitin and Paul Kerr, CRS Report RS22937 (Washington, 
DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, June 19, 2012), 1. Special nuclear material means plutonium or enriched uranium in the isotopes 233 or 
235. 
 
2 Ibid, p. 2 
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 In 2009, the United States signed an unprecedented NCA with the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), under which the UAE forswore enrichment and reprocessing of all 
nuclear materials, not just those received from the United States. As a state party to the 
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the UAE thus gave up its 
“inalienable right” to “develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes without discrimination…”
3
 Another Middle Eastern country, Jordan, 
has resisted signing a NCA with the United States that would include the same provisions 
on enrichment and reprocessing as the UAE’s.   
 U.S. NCAs have both real and symbolic benefits for the client state. First, they 
allow for U.S. nuclear material transfers; second, as the strictest agreements in the world, 
the client receives internationally recognized nonproliferation credibility.
4
 However, the 
United States’ heightened requirements in their agreements – that is, that U.S. NCA 
clients must forswear indigenous uranium enrichment on the front end and reprocessing 
fuel on the back end not just of U.S.-origin materials but of any other origin material as 
well – have had a tangible effect on the United States’ ability to conclude them. Potential 
and existing nuclear trading partners have had second thoughts about whether the benefits 
                                                 
3 “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” April 22, 1970, The International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC 140, 3. Emphasis mine; it is important 
to note that the US-UAE NCA has two provisions that lessen the impact of the deal. First, the agreement’s “Agreed Minute” states that UAE may renege on the deal 
if another Middle East country signs a NCA without similar no enrichment and reprocessing provisions. Second, while Article 7 of the agreement states that the UAE 
commits to the non-acquisition of sensitive nuclear facilities, Article 12 of the agreement reads that the commitment does not forsake the UAE’s fundamental rights 
under the NPT. (Early (2013), p. 278, note 52). However, this paper is interested in the commitment the UAE made and why Jordan is not making a similar one. 
 
4 Chen Kane, “US nuclear cooperation agreements and the Middle East,” Arms Control and Regional Security For the Middle East Blog, entry posted on August 3, 




of trade and/or international approval are incentive enough to relinquish their rights to a 
full nuclear fuel cycle.
5
  
 Conventional wisdom tells us that alliances, especially in the Middle East, matter 
a great deal to Middle East foreign policy calculations. Indeed, as Chen Kane argues,  
ANY nuclear cooperation agreement with the 
United States is about why the country needs or 
wants the U.S. blessing or cooperation for its 
nuclear energy program and what leverage the 
United States has over these countries. And as far as 
I know, the United States has leverage, be it 
military, political or economic, over many countries 




However, the United States’ leverage over its weaker and less powerful allies does not 
seem to be as important as one may think.  
 This study is about what is driving the disparate outcomes in Jordan and the UAE 
in terms of their decisions to conclude NCAs with the United States. Jordan is among the 
states that have decided not to sign the U.S. NCA despite its strong alliance with the 
United States and desire to move forward with a nuclear energy program. On the other 
hand, the UAE is also closely allied with the United States, but it signed an 
unprecedented agreement, giving up its right to a full nuclear fuel cycle.  
 The paper makes two assumptions. First, the NPT regime’s guiding principle that 
states, rather than the market, should control the international movement of nuclear 
technology (unlike in other areas of international trade) provides a space for smaller and 
                                                 
5 Fred McGoldrick, The U.S.-UAE Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: A Gold Standard or Fools Gold? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, November 30, 2010).  
 
6 Kane (2012, A) 
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weaker states to succeed in negotiations with more powerful states. Second, because 
states in the international nonproliferation regime have greater authoritative control of the 
transfer of materials, they can make calculations vis-à-vis bilateral trade agreements that 
they perceive will help their long-term power positions in the international system. 
  In relation, then, to the two cases under review here, I argue Jordan and the 
United Arab Emirates based their decisions to conclude nuclear cooperation agreements 
with the United States on power-relational rather than economic or political 
considerations. Put another way, the two countries power positions in the international 
system drove their decisions. Even though concluding an NCA with the United States 
may help Jordan gain economically in the short run by allowing it to move forward with a 
nuclear program more quickly, doing so would keep Jordan more dependent on 
international assistance than if it were able to exploit its natural uranium reserves for 
eventual fuel export. On the other hand, while it may have been economical for the 
United Arab Emirates to develop an indigenous uranium capacity as part of its nuclear 
power program, the UAE had a greater interest in the ability to overcome its history as an 
enabler of nuclear proliferation and thus quickly develop a nuclear power program. 
 The link between sovereign decision-making and the nonproliferation regime is 
manifested through Article IV of the NPT. Article IV provides the right of any state to 
develop a full nuclear fuel cycle on its soil.  Most nuclear materials are not sold on an 
open international market; materials, technology, and know-how are controlled primarily 
by states. In this way, Krasner refers to the nonproliferation regime as “authoritative.” As 
such, Krasner argues, it is “more likely that a durable, mutually acceptable pattern of 
5 
 
behavior will established.” States agree on the regime’s “basic norms and principles” so 
states can expect to resolve agreements within the regime’s framework.
7
 Moreover, the 
NPT has one of the most extensive participation rates of global treaties, adding to the 
“buy-in” on norms and principles. The Article IV norm is strongly held by many NPT 
states parties and is seen as a point of leverage over nuclear weapons states and other 
suppliers (most of whom are in the developed world) that wish to curtail transfers of fuel 
cycle technologies. Indeed, as part of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 120 members of 
the Non-Aligned Movement issued a statement that said of Article IV’s guarantee to 
“research, produce, and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, “…NAM States 
Parties do not see any room for reinterpretation or setting of conditions for the peaceful 





                                                 
7 Stephen Krasner, Structural Conflict (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 287-290.  
 
8 United Nations, Non-Aligned Movement Statement before the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons Treaty, given by 
H.E. Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (New York, 2010), 4.  
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Source: World Nuclear Association 
 There are two interrelated implications of this research, one for U.S. policy and 
the other for prospects for internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle -- an arrangement 
whereby states would no longer have sovereign control over the production of nuclear 
fuel. With regard to the first, the question among American policymakers is whether the 
UAE NCA should be the “Gold Standard”
9
 or whether new or renewed agreements 
should be negotiated on a case-by-case basis.  Proponents of the Gold Standard argue that 
the dangers of nuclear technology proliferation necessitate a strict U.S. position on 
enrichment and reprocessing and that the benefits of doing business do not outweigh this 
imperative. Opponents of the Gold Standard may agree that the diffusion of nuclear 
technology is dangerous, but argue that the competitive international nuclear industry 
leaves the U.S. with little leverage to dictate terms.
10
  
 Based on this paper’s finding that autocratic states participating within the 
existing structure of the nuclear nonproliferation regime base their fuel cycle decisions on 
their strategic positions rather than purely economic or political reasons, I argue that the 
Gold Standard approach should be abandoned. It appears that without providing better 
incentives, U.S. policy will not be able to dictate nuclear fuel cycle terms to new or 
existing nuclear power countries. Even (or especially) if the U.S. continues to implement 
a case-by-case policy with regard to nuclear cooperation agreements, it should not allow 
NCAs to become an end rather than a means to more effective global nonproliferation 
policy. I argue that the changes in U.S. leverage, the increased demand for new nuclear 
                                                 
9 Jessica Varnum, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation as Nonproliferation: Reforms, or the Devil You Know?” note 5, (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Institute, November 
27, 2012). http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/us-nuclear-cooperation-nonproliferation-reforms-or-devil-you-know/ (accessed May 30, 2013). 
 
10 Kane (2012 A) 
7 
 
energy development, and the expansion of existing nuclear energy programs necessitates 
a genuine U.S. effort to enact a global multilateral nuclear fuel cycle arrangement where 
states would get their fuel from an independent entity. However, if countries are making 
decisions based on their relative power positions within the international system, and how 
changes to the regime would affect those positions, such an arrangement would need to 
ensure that all participating states would be provided fair and equitable treatment.   
 The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows. The rest of Section I will 
expound on the above argument, describe how other theories would explain the 
outcomes, provide a brief rationale for the research question, and describe the 
comparative method used. Sections II and III present the two cases, providing evidence 
for the arguments above and alternative explanations that appear less likely. The final 
section, Section IV, will provide an overview of the arguments, demonstrate the 
overarching challenges to the nonproliferation regime in greater detail, and present policy 
implications and recommendations based on the case studies.    
The argument: The power-maximizing tendencies of states and international regimes  
 This study adopts the Realist assumptions that states are rational actors and will 
seek to maximize their power in the international system under conditions of anarchy. In 
the absence of an overarching order, states find it difficult to trust one another and will 
revert to acting in ways that support their own interests. As a result, cooperation among 
states can often be difficult. Jervis explains the dilemma as follows: 
States must worry that others will seek to take advantage of them; 
agreements must be crafted to minimize the danger of double crosses; 
the incentives that operate when agreements are signed may be quite 
different when the time comes for them to be carried out; and both 
8 
 




 In a Realist paradigm, a state’s economic choices are fundamentally, in the end, 
about a political motive.   
National interest may at times be influenced by the peculiar economic 
interests of classes, elites, or other subgroups of the society; but factors 
of geography, external configurations of power, and the exigencies of 




The Realist argument emphasizes that international trade occurs not because it is in both 
states’ interests (though, sometimes it is) but rather because the hegemon has dictated a 
system that works for it and weaker states are often forced to opt into the system. Gilpin 
argues, “In the absence of economic and especially the political influence of the 




 Thus, Realist theory would expect a state to pursue economic power in the service 
of its national interests.  This means we should expect states to “seek to diversify their 
economies and lessen dependence on others, thereby reducing their vulnerability to 
economic coercion, and obtain a larger share of the gains produced by…the relative gains 
from trade.”
14
 Lake notes there are two primary ways a state can grow its economy: trade 
and capital transfers. He argues that while trade can enhance national and global welfare, 
only capital transfers can increase economic power.
15
 This is especially true in countries 
                                                 
11 Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” International Security, 24, no. 1 (1999): 42-63, 43-44. 
 
12 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975, 28. 
 
13 Gilpin, 33 
   
14 David A. Lake, “Power and the Third World: Toward a Realist Political Economy of North-South Relations,” International Studies Quarterly, 31, No. 2 (Jun., 




with a surplus of labor and little capital in that trade exacerbates specialization –thereby 
enhancing economic welfare – and therefore precludes diversification of the economy. 
Moreover, labor-intensive products add little to the value chain of production, whereas 
capital-intensive goods “are usually high value added manufactured goods early in their 
product cycles. Through learning or by stimulating technological innovation, such goods 
often produce significant positive externalities.”
16
   
  Krasner (1985) also argues that developing states, on the whole, prefer more 
“authoritative” as opposed to market-oriented modes of allocation.
17
  Authoritative 
modes of allocation include direct allocation of resources by political authorities or 
indirect allocation by limiting private actors, such as corporations from entering the 
market.
18
  By adopting authoritative modes of allocation, leaders are better able to hedge 
against exogenous shocks that may cause unrest and instability, as well as declines in 
material well-being.
19
 Thus, contrary to an “economistic” notion that political power is 
subordinate to wealth-maximization, Krasner’s self-styled “modified realist” contention 
is that “in international forums concerned with global regimes, the most important 
motivation of the Third World is to reduce vulnerability by supporting principles, norms, 
and rules that legitimate authoritative allocation rather than market-oriented allocation.”
20
 
Krasner uses this contention to explain why, in the 1970s, the developing world banded 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Lake, 229 
16 Lake, ibid 
 
17 Krasner, 5 
 
18 Ibid, 5 
 
19 Krasner, 6 
 
20 Krasner, 306 
10 
 
together to pursue the “New International Economic Order,” a proposal to change the 
dominant “liberal” paradigm governing international economic exchange.   
Three variables highlighted by Kranser as important to the success of 
international regimes appear to characterize the development and current state of the 
international nonproliferation regime. First, as has been mentioned, the regime is 
governed by state- rather than market control of nuclear materials, technology, and know-
how. Second, developing countries (i.e., the less powerful states) have a cogent and 
unified voice as regards their demands of the developed world. Third, the power-wielding 
states, particularly the United States, must have relatively less influence over existing 
regimes.
21
   
 Briefly, I will cover these three features of the nonproliferation regime –state-
controlled trade, “weak” state grievance cogency, and the limited influence of powerful 
states -- in more detail.  Early efforts to internationalize nuclear trade –i.e. establish a 
supranational agency that would  control the means of production of the nuclear fuel 
cycle and dispense licenses to countries wishing to pursue nuclear energy
22
 -- failed 
because the international environment did not allow for states to trust that all parties 
would follow through on commitments to hand over their resources. The result has been 
the establishment of two formal institutions -- the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
established in 1957, and the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 
                                                 
21 Kranser, pp. 7-10 
 




which entered into force in 1970 -- that set the rules and norms of the international 
nuclear nonproliferation regime.  
 Essentially, the regime created two distinct classes of states: those possessing 
nuclear weapons and states legally prohibited from possessing them. Within the regime 
they are known as nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non nuclear weapons states 
(NNWS). While the regime is inherently discriminatory, a grand bargain was negotiated: 
Article IV of the NPT dictated that NNWS would have NWS assistance with 
indiscriminate access to development of the nuclear fuel cycle and NWS would take steps 
to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. At the time, the Article IV requirement stemmed, in 
part, from the fact that technical knowledge about nuclear power was concentrated 
among very few countries, including the United States and Russia.
23
  
 From the 1970s to 1990s, the normal process of technology, materials, and 
knowledge transfer in the nuclear arena spurred familiar tensions regarding the spread of 
the fuel cycle: nuclear suppliers attempted to control the supply nuclear technologies and 
materials over the protests of non-nuclear weapons states.
24
 However, members of the 
regime were willing to work within its confines because, as Krasner argues, “the North 
and the South…agree[d] that the international movement of nuclear technology and 
material must be subject to state decisions rather than the market.”  
 With the nonproliferation regime’s accepted norms and principles allowing for 
relative negotiating parity between “weak” and “strong” states, in negotiating with the 
United States on nuclear cooperation agreements, Jordan and the UAE took decisions 
                                                 
23 Joseph A. Yager, International Cooperation in Nuclear Energy, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution) 1981. 
  
24 Krasner, 289. 
12 
 
based on their resource endowments. As Lake argues, Realism would expect weaker 
states to conduct trade that would bolster their international power positions, that is, 
allowing them greater economic independence. Jordan is a country with “few natural 
resources and a small industrial base” and its economy is heavily dependent on “external 
aid from abroad, tourism, expatriate worker remittances, and the service sector.”
25
 In 
other words, we would expect Jordan to seek to develop any and all value-added 
resources it has in order to diversify its economy. In the words of Jordan’s leading 
nuclear energy official, enrichment is “the source of strength in its nuclear program.”
26
 
Without it, the program would not necessarily be worth pursuing. We would also expect 
the UAE to engage in trade that would continue the economic independence the UAE has 
enjoyed from its vast oil reserves. For the UAE, one path to maintaining economic 
independence is the development of a nuclear power program. It needed U.S. approval, in 
the form of the cooperation agreement, to move forward with a nuclear energy program 
and overcome questions about its involvement in proliferation of nuclear weapons after 
serving as a transshipment hub in the A.Q. Khan Proliferation network. 
Other International Relations Theories and Nuclear Cooperation 
Liberalism and its variants 
 Liberals contend that wealth accumulation rather than power per se motivates 
rational actors, including states. Liberals also believe that states’ interests are 
                                                 
25 U.S. Library of Congress, CRS, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report RL33546, (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and 
Publishing) April 9, 2010, 7. 
 
26 Allison MacFarlane, “Where, How, and Why Will Nuclear Happen? Nuclear ‘Renaissance’ Discourses from Buyers and Suppliers,” in Adam Stulberg and 





 and therefore international trade will produce mutually beneficial economic 
effects resulting, eventually, in the end of interstate conflict. Thus, states would be 
expected to act in ways that maximize their wealth rather over their power in the 
international system.  If we were to look at the cases of Jordan and the UAE through a 
Liberal lens, we would expect the opposite outcomes, or at the very least, we would not 
expect the outcomes observed. Jordan would have no reason not to engage in an NCA 
with the United States because indigenous uranium enrichment only becomes cost 
effective when a state can capably produce 10 gigawatts of nuclear power. Jordan’s plans 
entail producing ~3 GW of nuclear power by 2025.
28
  Although Jordan wishes to exploit 
its domestic uranium reserves, wealth maximization rather than economic independence 
would be Jordan’s primary motivator. We might expect the UAE to pursue other actors, 
such as Russia, that would trade with the UAE setting conditions on development of the 
full nuclear fuel cycle.  
 An offshoot of liberalism is neoliberal institutionalism, which attempts to account 
for states’ cooperation behavior. As Jervis points out, the difference between realism and 
neoliberalism is over states’ motivations for conflict and cooperation and the 
corresponding ways in which cooperation might be achieved.
29
 Like realism, neoliberal 
institutionalism holds that conflict is the result of insufficient information about actors’ 
intentions. However, unlike realists, neoliberals believe that institutions – whether formal 
                                                 
27 Gilpin, 27 
 
28 Sharon Squassoni, “Mapping Nuclear Power’s Future Spread” (Chapter 2) in Henry Sokolski (ed), Nuclear Power’s Global Expansion: Weighing It’s Costs and 
Risks, Strategic Studies Institute, 69. 
 
29 Jervis, pp. 42-43 
14 
 
or informal – are the desired mechanism to help states overcome information 
asymmetries.
30
  In the absence of formal institutions, states can signal to each other 
credible commitments by sending “costly signals” that demonstrate a state is willing to 
incur a cost that it might not have otherwise in order to participate in war or to 
cooperate.
31
 One example of costly signals is an audience cost, or the political fallout 
from leaders reneging on their commitments.
32
  
 Stulberg (2013) argues that it is particularly difficult for states to signal intentions 
regarding cooperation on multilateral nuclear approaches (MNAs), i.e., arrangements that 
would require states to give up sovereign fuel cycle rights.
33
 He suggests that the credible 
commitment problem arises for several reasons. First, MNAs create varying reputational 
costs for different actors. Thus, “it is not clear a priori what the meaning of reputation is 
for a customer state, whether it works as a single identity, how states manage multiple 
reputations across different issue areas and which reputation matters most for nuclear 
energy bargaining.”
34
 Second, MNAs hold different status for different countries. No 
single regime type can be said to have a preference for MNAs, thus complicating “the 
ability of nuclear suppliers and customers to convince one another of the normative or 
                                                 
30 Jervis 
 
31 James D. Fearon, Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,  The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41, No. 1,  (Feb.,1997):  68-90, 69.  
 
32 Fearon, 69 
 
33 Adam Stulberg, “Confronting the Credible Commitment Problem,” in Adam Stulberg and Matthew Furhmann (editors), Nuclear Renaissance and International 
Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2013). 
 




domestic political costs that they would incur by reneging on nuclear obligations.”
35
 
Third, even benignly motivated suppliers and customers cannot signal that they will not 
renege on fuel supply commitments: history shows that political changes have indeed 
affected a number of nuclear fuel transactions, in turn creating unacceptable costs for one 
or both of the parties.
36
 As a result, states cannot signal “ex ante” that changes to the 
commitments will not occur “ex post.”   
 Stulberg argues that successful MNAs hinge on the customers’ projected future 
reliance of its nuclear energy program as part of its overall reliance on energy coupled 
with the suppliers’ share of market power – as a measure of the power dynamic between 
the customer and supplier. Future reliance would be important for the state’s ability to 
secure an agreement because “the more reliant a state expects to be on nuclear power for 
its energy security, the more important it will become to secure a steady fuel supply.” 
Trust issues are compounded if the supplier’s share of the market grows “too large” 
(Stulberg estimates the threshold at 25 percent). Even if its intentions are benign, a 
prospective nuclear trading partner becomes untrustworthy when it has a large enough 
market share. 
Under this framework, one would expect the UAE and Jordan to face similar 
prospective trading partners – all options would be open -- but have a different reliance 
on nuclear energy as part of their overall energy source. Jordan’s reliance would be 
greater and therefore we would expect it to have more difficulty trusting its prospective 
partners. The UAE, on the other hand, has more ability to engage in agreements because 
                                                 





of its energy independence. Indeed, in his article, Stulberg argues that UAE engaged in 
“cheap talk.” It could signal its own benign intentions with regard to nuclear power by 
foreswearing enrichment and reprocessing, and facing a plethora of potential suppliers 
and no need to secure a constant nuclear fuel supply, it could sign an agreement with the 
United States easily.
37
  Ultimately, while the argument is compelling, it would be 
exceedingly difficult to predict the level at which states could overcome the asymmetric 
informational issues. It would be difficult to know at what point Jordan’s nuclear energy 
reliance becomes too great to inhibit, or the UAE’s sufficient to enable, cooperation.    
 Finally, a domestic politics approach (using a societal rather than state level of 
analysis) would focus on how domestic politics affects foreign policy decision-making. 
Given that both countries have authoritarian regimes (though are accountable to their 
populous to different degrees), the most salient relationship we would examine would be 
that between elites and institutions and the way in which they threaten their leadership.
38
 
On its face, a domestic politics argument appears credible. That is, one might argue that 
Jordan needed to appease domestic political actors, particularly elites, while the UAE did 
not because Jordan was facing more internal pressure. But, as a recent review of 
Jordanian politics shows, elites do not constitute such a threat because the electoral 
system allows the King to maintain control over newly elected representatives.
39
 In 
addition, the UAE’s president, Shaikh Khalifa bin Zayed, has benefited from kinship 
                                                 
37 Stulberg, pp.110-112 
 
38 Erica Frantz and Natasha Ezrow, The Politics of Dictatorship: Institutions and Outcomes in Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers) 2011, 6. 
 




loyalties and shrewd political maneuvering to maintain tight control over the seven 
emirates that make up the UAE. However, it has also been argued that expected future 
loss of control of elites may have also influenced the UAE’s decision.
40
 The UAE’s 
natural gas shortage and impending energy crisis threatens, among other things, 
legitimacy of the ruling party. As will be shown, nuclear energy would provide a strategy 
to shore up petroleum export revenues and maintain its system patronage in the long 
run.
41
  Here there is overlap between a domestic politics argument and the realist 
argument.  While I assert that the structure of the international nuclear nonproliferation 
regime and the UAE’s position within the international system provided it leverage to 
negotiate an agreement giving up its full cycle rights, I also argue that subsumed within 
this calculation was the way in which the nuclear program would ultimately benefit the 
regime.        
Constructivism    
 Unlike realists and liberals, constructivists do not assume that states are rational 
actors or that they have a determined set of preferences.
42
  Rather, under a constructivist 
paradigm, states and structures are “mutually constituted”
43
 – as the title of the seminal 
work on constructivism, “Anarchy is What States Make of It”
44
 suggests. The approach 
addresses how identities and norms shape processes rather than Realist inquiries 
                                                 
40 Li-Chen Sim, “Re-branding Abu Dhabi: From oil giant to energy titan,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 8, No. 1, pp.83-98, 86. 
 
41 Sim, p. 86 
 
42 Ted Hofp, “The Promise of Constructivism,” International Security, 23, No. 1, (Summer 1998): 171-200. 
 
43 Hofp, 172 
 




regarding how structures (i.e., the international system) incentivize actors (i.e., states).
45
  
Although it is not necessarily a predictive theory, Hopf argues that constructivism 
provides “alternative accounts of mainstream puzzles,” such as the realist’s security 
dilemma and the neoliberal institutionalist’s accounts of cooperation under anarchy.
46
 In 
general, a constructivist approach would examine the sources of a state’s interests and 
identities: uncertainty would not always lead to a security dilemma; it would be a variable 
to be understood based on states’ conceptions of other states’ interests. Rather than take 
as a given that information asymmetries can often preclude cooperation, constructivism 
assumes that cooperation can be a natural state between actors.  
  In this way, a constructivist approach may provide an important complementary 
explanation for the outcomes related to Jordanian and Emirati nuclear cooperation with 
the United States. Under this paradigm, we might examine how the international 
nonproliferation regime has shaped states’ identities and vice versa. Some argue that 
states’ perceptions regarding the NPT’s “grand bargain” – wherein Non Nuclear 
Weapons States (NNWS) are promised full access to the use of the atom for peaceful 
purposes in return for their promise of not developing nuclear weapons -- has created a 
need for NNWS to insist on fuel cycle equity even though they don’t plan to exploit this 
“right.”  For instance, as U.S. State Department official Richard Stratford stated with 
regard to the possibility of a new law requiring all NCAs to have the same provisions as 
the UAE’s:  
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…that can be problematic. Why? Because a very large part of 
the Non-Aligned Movement and those that might proceed into 
nuclear are not people who are going to sign away their, quote, 




 Although Constructivism does not necessarily have set theoretical expectations, 
existing literature does use Constructivism to predict proliferation behavior. In relation to 
this study, Maria Rublee’s (2009) argument that states make proliferation choices based 
on the “international social environment” rather than “an overwhelming quest for security 
(Realism) or a “set of cost-benefit calculations (neoliberal institutionalism)”
48
 is more 
applicable to the question of UAE’s signing of the NCA than Jordan’s. For instance, she 
argues that “the fear of social costs and the desire for social rewards can motivate states 
to exercise nuclear forbearance.” Within this prediction, she argues that states would 
engage only in what is minimally required by the NPT and “will look for, and where 
feasible, exploit loopholes in NPT and other related treaties.”
49
 While the question is over 
nuclear power and not nuclear weapons, Rublee’s prediction appears to be an accurate 
representation of the UAE’s behavior. Up until it began thinking about nuclear energy, it 
had not signed the “Additional Protocol” allowing for more invasive inspections by the 
IAEA. On the other hand, the UAE did not sign the U.S. NCA and engage in other 
“good” nonproliferation behavior simply to come into good international favor but rather 
because doing so allowed it to move forward with a nuclear energy program. 
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Constructivism may be a promising avenue for further research, especially given the 
importance of norms and rules in the nonproliferation regime. 
Rationale for the study 
The enduring attempts to promote “peaceful” uses of the atom and prevent nuclear 
weapons proliferation 
 From the U.S. perspective, nuclear nonproliferation has long been an important 
objective in ensuring international security; however, new challenges to the 
nonproliferation regime -- the diffusion of technology, material and know-how; the 
expansion of industry suppliers; and the development of a clandestine nuclear trade 
network – add impetus to the urgency of global nonproliferation efforts.  As Scott Sagan 
notes,  
A fundamental goal for American and global security is to minimize 
the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of nuclear power. 
If this development is poorly managed or the efforts to contain risks are 
unsuccessful, the nuclear future will be dangerous.”
50  
 
Thus, an objective of this study is to learn what leverage the U.S. and other major powers 
will have when or if they pursue more stringent restrictions on the expansion of nuclear 
technology than current policy dictates.    
Why the United Arab Emirates and Jordan? 
 I chose to examine Jordan and the UAE for two main reasons. First, they allow 
for a sound initial probe of the research question using a most similar system design, 
which selects cases based on similarities of potential explanatory variables and 
differences with respect to the dependent variable. The similarities that might bear on 
                                                 




proliferation include geography, racial and sectarian composition of the state’s 
population, regime features, and alliance dynamics; that is, they are located in the Middle 
East, have Sunni Arab population, are ruled by authoritarian regimes, and are closely 
allied with the United States. The important difference for this paper, however, as has 
been stated, is their choice for their respective nuclear programs about whether to 
explicitly renounce enrichment and reprocessing rights in a NCA with the United States. 
Thus, to be explicit, the dependent variable is the two states’ divergent choices in 
concluding an NCA with the U.S. and the independent variable is their relative power 
positions within the international system. 
 A secondary motivation for choosing these two cases is their relevance to U.S. 
foreign policy. The Middle East is a hotbed of controversy related to nuclear weapons 
issues, not least with regard to Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions and the resultant 
reactionary policies of its neighbors; the tensions surrounding the Arab-Israeli security 
dilemma, including Israel’s ambiguous policy toward its own nuclear weapons stockpile; 
and the United States’ historically ill-conceived actions regarding nuclear weapons in the 
region, such as the preemptive war with Iraq over its perceived weapons of mass 
destruction program. As a consequence, these factors contribute to Middle Eastern states’ 
rationales regarding their nuclear fuel cycles. Depending on whether the United States 
can meet its nonproliferation goals in the Middle East, the global nonproliferation norm 
may be strengthened. This is especially important in light of some observers’ worry about 
the United States’ waning influence in this arena,
51
 both in terms of its foothold as an 
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industry leader and its ability to exert leverage over former allies for non commercially-
related reasons.  
The Comparative Method 
 The cases in this paper were chosen for the reason listed above: to provide a 
compelling initial probe of a research question in which the similarities among the 
potential explanatory variable provide a puzzle for the difference in outcomes. The data 
collected is mainly from a combination of primary and secondary sources, such as 
newspaper articles and academic journals. In addition, I conducted non-for-attribution 
interviews with a current U.S. government official directly involved in negotiating 
NCAs
52
, and two background interviews with a scholar
53
 and former government 
official
54
 with knowledge of US nuclear cooperation agreements. Due to time and 
resource constraints, I was precluded from conducting surveys of in-country decision-
makers and members of the general population. Likewise, the paper utilizes little public 
polling data because very few polls have been independently conducted. Information 
gaps constrain the validity of the arguments and the lack of cases constrains the paper’s 
generalizability. Nonetheless, I argue that the results of this study will provide 
preliminary insights on states’ fuel cycle decisions, implications for U.S. and global 
nonproliferation policy, and impetus for a future research program.   
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 The purpose of this study is to understand what has motivated Jordan and the 
UAE in making different decisions regarding nuclear cooperation with the United States 
and thus access to the full nuclear fuel cycle. Using a Realist approach, I argue that the 
difference can be explained by the significant disparity in their relative power positions 
within the international system. Within this paradigm, the two countries have different 
goals regarding the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and take different 
actions to reach those goals. Correspondingly, the features of international nuclear 
nonproliferation regime are conducive to allowing for challenges from developing 
countries like Jordan in that (1) trade is based on an authoritative rather than market-
based mode of allocation, (2) there is consensus among states regarding the importance of 
rules and norms governing the regime (i.e., the “grand bargain,”) and (3) the influence of 
the regime’s powerful actors -- the nuclear weapons states -- is not overwhelming.  The 
argument here has important implications for the prospect of internationalizing the 
nuclear fuel cycle. First, it demonstrates that alliances do not drive states’ decisions 
regarding their fuel cycle rights. In this way, the U.S. would be foolish to attempt to 
perpetuate the “Gold Standard:” it would lose what existing nonproliferation leverage it 
has while other countries move in to supply new and expanding nuclear states. Second, it 
shows that any arrangement that relieves states of their sovereignty must be equitable and 
provide compensation for the benefits they would otherwise receive for developing an 
indigenous nuclear fuel cycle.  The study uses a most similar system design and the 
24 
 
conclusions I have drawn have been inferred from press accounts, the existing literature, 
and author interviews.  
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Chapter Two. The United Arab Emirates 
 The Puzzle 
 There are economic, ideological, and practical reasons to expect that the United 
Arab Emirates would not sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States, 
which restricts domestic enrichment and reprocessing.  First, for states intent on 
producing at least 8-10 gigawatts of electricity, it may be cost effective to develop an 
indigenous enrichment capacity.
55
 Indeed, the UAE has ambitious plans for its nuclear 
program. The UAE estimates that “it must expand its power generation and transmission 
capacity from the current level of 16 gigawatts to 40 gigawatts in order to meet projected 
[domestic electricity] demand increases.”
56
 Second, as MacFarlane argues and has been 
noted above, “The issue of equity among countries plays a special role in the acquisition 
of nuclear power technology.”
57
 Finally, given the political nature of nuclear trade, if a 
country is serious about its nuclear energy program, any country giving up the right to 
indigenous enrichment is necessarily putting itself at risk of not having a secure fuel 
supply.  
The Argument: The UAE’s position within the International System 
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 The UAE, as a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), has historically promoted its “Third World” goals
58
 through colluding with its 
fellow petroleum-rich states to charge high prices on oil and gas exports. Krasner argues 
that the “creation of OPEC was, during the mid- and late 1970s, the most effective 
exercise of power by the South against the North since the conclusion of the Second 
World War.”
59
 The power OPEC countries have wielded since its creation has increased 
oil producing countries’ leverage in international affairs bargaining.  What’s more, on the 
whole, developing countries – highly negatively impacted by OPEC’s formation and 
subsequent steep increase in oil prices – did not condemn OPEC’s behavior; rather, they 
saw OPEC as a “model to be emulated,”
60
 further enhancing OPEC’s power.   
 The UAE’s position has only strengthened, not only as a result of its OPEC 
membership but also of its strategy to attract foreign investment and foreign talent by 
cultivating a diversified economic system.
61
 Consequently, the UAE has been able to 
maintain a strong alliance with the United States. The U.S. trusts in the stability and 
reliability of the UAE as an oil supplier
62
 and the U.S. has sold the UAE tens of billions 
of dollars worth of military equipment.
63
  Thus, today, the UAE finds itself in an 
advantageous position within the international system and is taking steps to perpetuate 
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this position over the long-term. One of these steps includes the development of a nuclear 
energy program. I argue that while the UAE may sympathize with developing states’ 
desires to maintain an equitable nonproliferation regime, it is more concerned about the 
real benefits that nuclear energy will have on its long-term power position. 
Manifestation of its international power position vis-à-vis nuclear cooperation 
 Realists argue that a country’s economic prospects are closely linked with its 
national interests. Unlike Liberals who assert that states will partake in economic 
exchange to maximize wealth for the wealth’s sake, Realists argue that economic 
relations are done in the service of political aims. Realists also contend that the goal of 
“economic (and political) activity…is the redistribution of wealth” in the areas of 
employment, industry and military power.
64
 It is within this paradigm that I argue that 
UAE signed the NCA with the United States. The UAE wanted to ensure the quick 
development of a nuclear energy program as part of its strategy to maintain its ability to 
provide rents to its citizens and its power position within the international system. The 
program’s success did not hinge on the exploitation of the country’s natural resources but 
rather on the ability overcome its questionable nonproliferation record, discussed below, 
in order to attract nuclear suppliers.  
The UAE’s national interest – maintaining economic independence  
  The UAE faces both demographic and energy challenges that threaten its long-
term national interests. Knowing of the impending oil and gas shortage, the UAE’s 
                                                 






 that relative economic decline would challenge its various “internal 
and external survival strategies – including [a] distributive economic system and overseas 
soft power accumulation.”
66
  Consequently, the country adopted a strategy of developing 
nuclear energy to free up oil and gas production for export while using nuclear power as a 
base load source of power to fuel the country’s various demand areas. Standing in the 
way of these plans were questionable nonproliferation credentials that made suppliers 
hesitant to engage in trade. American officials revealed that the UAE’s port of Dubai 
served as a hub for the A.Q. Khan clandestine nuclear trade network from which 
centrifuge technology was shipped to Libya, for example.
67
  Thus, in signing the NCA, 
the UAE was eager to prove its peaceful intentions for nuclear power
68
 and was willing to 
gamble an insecure fuel supply to prevent stalling plans to commence the nuclear energy 
program. In addition, all of the bids under consideration by the UAE contained for U.S. 
patented technology. Indeed, in 2009, the Economist Intelligence Unit reported that the 
UAE  
received offers from three groups earlier this year, and had indicated 
that it was aiming to award the contract in September. However, the 
schedule slipped slightly owing to the need to secure ratification of a 
US government agreement allowing the transfer of nuclear 
technology.
69  
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Therefore, if nuclear reactor components or fuel were to be transferred from the United 
States, the UAE knew it needed to win Congressional approval. Its strategy was to 
emphasize the peaceful nature of the program through both rhetoric and actions.
70
 The 
UAE, for example, signed the Additional Protocol with the IAEA to allow for greater 
inspections of its future nuclear program.   
 As mentioned above, the UAE’s nuclear energy program is part of a larger 
national strategy to maintain economic independence long “after the end of the oil era 
(even if that is still a long way in the future.)”
71
 The purpose of the program is to ensure 
the survival of the state through what has been called by Christopher M. Davidson the 
“‘ruling bargain:” “distributed wealth, the fostering of a dependent patrimonial elite, the 
reinvigoration (and at times reinvention) of historical and cultural sources of legitimacy, 
and, of course, the building of strategic alliances with oil-buying superpowers.”
72
  The 
UAE would use nuclear energy as a base load power for domestic electricity generation – 
a current limitation of other forms of alternative energies such as wind and solar
73
 and a 
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more reliable power source than oil and gas.
74
 Freeing up petroleum reserves would 
increase its export revenues and shore up its ability to maintain the rentier economy.  
 As is widely known, UAE derives its wealth through its oil and natural gas 
reserves. A member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
UAE is the fourth largest net exporter of oil in the world.
75
  However, the country faces a 
looming energy supply crunch.
76
  The Economist Intelligence Unit estimates that primary 
energy demand will grow 71 percent by 2019.
77
  As a sign of the increased demand, the 
UAE is already a net importer of natural gas (from Qatar) even though it has the world’s 
seventh largest natural gas reserves.
78
  
 Energy demand is increasing for a number of reasons, including population 
growth and urbanization; market diversification in energy-intensive industries, such as 
petrochemicals and aluminum manufacture; and increased water demand to be met with 
desalination plants, which also require electricity. In addition, it has been argued that 
Gulf States, including the UAE, will become an increasingly attractive tourist destination, 
once plans to connect the small nations by high-speed rail are complete.
79
 Indeed, as part 
of its Plan 2030, Abu Dhabi –the largest and wealthiest of the seven emirates that 
constitute the UAE and the biggest force behind the nuclear energy program – seeks to 
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attract 7.9 million hotel guests per year by 2030, almost double the UAE’s population.
80
  
“Growing metropolises” are major energy consumers particularly of electricity – which 
requires availability of “reliable, abundant, and cheap” power production.
81
  
 Importantly, one of the main factors of the growing energy demand is a 
demographic shift.
82
 First, the population is growing rapidly but the number of Emirates 
is not outpacing the number of expatriates—in 2011, 11.5 percent of the total population 
was Emirate compared with 27.6 percent in 1992. In addition, the country is showing 
signs of a youth bulge; that is, where the younger population begins to reach employment 
age but jobs for them are scarce. The UAE’s brand of youth bulge is a little different in 
that there are a number of well-educated citizens but the available jobs do not fit their 
aspirations.
83
  Consequently, Sim argues, “the bloated public bureaucracy and capital 
intensive oil industry are no longer able to absorb the increasing number of highly 
educated young Emiratis,” straining the ruling bargain.
84
  Thus, a bonus of the nuclear 
energy program is that it would create jobs for these educated, unemployed youth. UAE 
officials have emphasized that 60 percent of Emirati nationals would operate the program 
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 The above factors demonstrates, as Li argues, that the main driver of the nuclear 
energy program was the “emirate’s domestic gas shortage and its effects on economic 
diversification and political legitimacy.”
86
 Contrary to what one might expect, the United 
States was not pressuring the UAE to make a deal; rather, the UAE had devised a strategy 
for courting two Western countries, the United States and France, so that it could move 
forward with its nuclear program.
87
 In its 2008 White Paper, the UAE stated its 
commitment to nonproliferation by “renouncing an intention to develop a domestic 
enrichment and reprocessing capability and undertaking to source fuel from reliable and 
responsible foreign suppliers.”
88
 One way to demonstrate its commitment was signing the 
deal with the United States. However, the UAE wanted to secure American 
Congressional approval and did not want to risk another 2006 “Dubai Ports” incident -- 
when Congress rebuked the Bush Administration-sanctioned right of the state-owned 
company, DP World, to purchase six American ports.
89
 Thus, the UAE not only agreed to 
the no enrichment and reprocessing provisions of the NCA but also enacted domestic 
legislation foreswearing these same rights.
90
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A. Regional rivalry with Iran  
 Some nuclear policy observers have noted that that UAE began seriously 
considering nuclear energy at the same time that the international community grew 
concerned about Iran’s belligerence regarding its own nuclear ambitions.
91
  Thus, the 
UAE may have had two motivations in signing a nuclear cooperation deal with the 
United States. First, it may have been motivated to demonstrate to Iran that it could create 
a domestic nuclear program without the technologies needed to enrich uranium.
92
 Indeed, 
the UAE has described its program as “peaceful by design” and as a model for other 
Middle Eastern countries to emulate.
93
 Second, it may have been motivated to develop a 
nuclear energy program as a hedge against Iran. Indeed, contrary to conventional wisdom 
that some types of nuclear cooperation are benign, Fuhrmann has shown in a quantitative 
study that all types of nuclear cooperation “raise the risk of proliferation.”
94
   
 While both arguments may have merit, it appears unlikely that the UAE, with a 
foreign policy that tries to be accommodative to its Iranian neighbor with whom it has 
tense relations,
95
 would go out of its way develop a nuclear program simply to attempt to 
put pressure on Iran. Such an argument also raises the question of why other Middle East 
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countries that showed similar interest in nuclear power around the same time period, 
including Jordan and Saudi Arabia, have not signed restrictive nuclear cooperation 
agreements with the United States. Moreover, given that the UAE is going out of its way 
to demonstrate its peaceful intentions, it would be challenging to argue that the country 
was seeking a program that may one day allow it to create a nuclear weapon. For 
instance,  
If ever a program was designed to make it ill-suited for 
proliferation, it is the UAE program. First, the program did not 
flow out of a political-military calculation but out of a rather 
robust energy policy debate.  Second, it specifically rejects 
acquiring the front or back ends of the fuel cycle. Third, it will 
be very happy to send away spent fuel and does not wish to 
pursue a plutonium economy. Fourth, it is in such a hurry to 
deploy power reactors that it is not going to pursue many of 
the preliminary steps that other countries do to get ready for 
nuclear power (e.g., operate research reactors, which we have 
seen in India and the DPRK are much more useful for small 





 As neither a member of the developing world nor that of the so-called advanced 
industrialized nations, the UAE may have sympathy for its fellow members of the 
international nuclear nonproliferation regime that wish that ensure sovereignty as their 
number one prerogative. This argument is given weight by the fact that the US NCA had 
a “most favored nation” provision in its agreed minute, where the UAE could renegotiate 
a new agreement if another Middle East country signed an agreement with the U.S. that 
had more favorable terms.
97
 However, ultimately, the UAE’s substantial leverage in 
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international dealings made the issue of nuclear fuel cycle sovereignty a less important 
issue. Without uranium reserves or other economic motives to maintain an enrichment 
and reprocessing option, the UAE signed an agreement that would allow it to eschew its 




Chapter Three: Jordan 
The Puzzle 
 A number of factors would have seemed to make the conclusion of a nuclear 
cooperation deal between Jordan and the United States more likely than it has turned out 
to be. Since 2007, the United States and Jordan have been negotiating a nuclear 
cooperation agreement (NCA) that would formally restrict Jordan from using sensitive 
nuclear technologies, such as enrichment and reprocessing, in return for the pledge of 
U.S. assistance in the development of its program. That year, Jordan and the United 
States signed a memorandum of understanding where Jordan agreed not to enrich and 
reprocess nuclear fuel on its soil. After the conclusion of the U.S.-UAE NCA, the United 
States has insisted that Jordan’s program include the same terms. The agreement would 
allow the United States to legally export nuclear materials, reactors, and reactor 
components to Jordan; however, it would not make those transfers inevitable. Far from it: 
Jordan is deciding between two non-U.S. firms as reactor vendors and those vendors are 
likely to supply nuclear fuel as well. Given that the United States is unlikely, in the short 
term, to assist Jordan’s nuclear program, what would be the incentive for Jordan to sign 
the agreement? One might expect that the Jordanian-American alliance is strong enough 
37 
 
to incentivize Jordan to cooperate.
98
  After all, in fiscal year 2012, the United States 
provided $736 million total in foreign aid.
99
  
The argument – Jordan’s weak power position and its uranium reserves  
 I argue that Jordan is strongly disinclined to forgo what it sees as its sovereign 
right as well as its as its long-term national security interest – the development of a 
nuclear energy program with the option to enrich uranium.  Jordan’s power position vis-
à-vis the rest of the world would suggest that it cannot give up the right to exploit its 
uranium reserves, which would allow for Jordan to finance the program and to one day 
become a regional fuel supply export location.  In other words, given Jordan’s current 
economic situation, the nuclear program wouldn’t make sense without the ability to 
enrich over the long term. Indeed, one rationale for Jordan’s energy program is to 
diversify its economy. Jordan is a resource poor state with little source of income. The 
regime has survived, partly, by adopting a strategy of buying off its population.  Laurie 
Brand argues that Jordan formed alliances with its Arab neighbors from the 1970s to the 
first Gulf war to maintaining economic security, a key strategy of rentier states like 
Jordan’s to keep its populous happy.
100
 Similarly, today, Jordan is heavily dependent on 
the United States for the same purpose. The U.S.-Jordanian alliance allows Jordan degree 
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of autonomy from greater Middle East powers, such as Saudi Arabia.
101
  However, now 
that Jordan’s alliance with the United States is constraining its ability to develop greater 
autonomy, it is acting contrary to the expectation that it would submit to U.S. demands to 
sign the NCA. 
 Jordan is facing a severe energy and water crisis in the coming decades; as a 
result, “development of secure alternative energy supplies is a top priority for the 
kingdom.”
102
 The energy and water crises stem from four interrelated issues, which, 
taken together, strain Jordan’s economic growth.
103
 First, the country is almost 
completely dependent on imported fossil fuels for its energy, rendering it vulnerable to 
supply disruptions. 96 percent of its energy is imported and 98 percent of energy 
consumption is from fossil fuels.
104
 Second, Jordan faces a water supply shortage. 
Because the country has limited indigenous water resources and water demand will only 
continue to grow, Jordan is considering relying on desalination plants, which in turn 
would require large amounts of energy production.
105
 Third, Jordan is concerned with 
environmental degradation from its heavy reliance fossil fuel consumption. And fourth, 
Jordan projects energy demand to rise between 4.5 to 6.2 percent per year between 
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through 2020; “meeting this demand would require an additional 4,000 MW at a cost of 
$4.2 billion to $5.2 billion.”
106
 
 To meet the growing energy demand and provide both energy and economic 
security, Jordan has been seriously considering nuclear power production. Under its 
national energy strategy, the country hopes that by 2020, nuclear energy will contribute 
six percent of its overall energy mix nuclear; by 2030, Jordan hopes that 30 percent of its 
energy mix will come from nuclear and that the country will be a net energy exporter.
107
  
According to Jordanian planners, meeting these goals would require establishing one 
750-1500 MWe reactor by 2020 and another by 2025.
108
  However, the program is 
hampered by major challenges, including an insufficient electric grid size to meet the 
plant’s needs; the inability to find an appropriate and safe site for the nuclear power 
plant; the desire, post-Fukushima, to contract for the safest reactor, which would 
necessitate using unproven technology; the questions that have arisen over Jordan’s 
strategic uranium reserves, once measured to be at least 70,000 metric tons
109
 and a key 
way to finance the program
110
; and the ability to find a partner to finance the program.
111
   
 Despite facing major challenges to the successful completion of a nuclear power 
program, Jordan remains invested in seeing through the development of a nuclear power 
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plant. In March 2013, perhaps to generate renewed interest in the stalled nuclear program, 
JAEC Chairman Toukan stated that Jordan had 150 years worth of uranium reserves 
located in central and southern Jordan, despite the French firm, AREVA, disputing the 




 Jordan sees nuclear energy as an important alternative to maintaining reliance on 
imported fossil fuels, a major inhibitor of Jordanian economic growth. Jordanian officials 
estimate that no other alternative energy technology will provide the base load power 
necessary to meet the country’s rapidly growing energy and water demands.
113
 Even in 
the face of major program difficulties, Jordan is proceeding with the development of its 
nuclear program, providing further evidence that the country is serious about nuclear as a 
way to become more energy independent and grow its economy. 
 I also argue that Jordan’s decision was based on its identity vis-à-vis the 
nonproliferation regime.  While it is difficult to discern from publicly available 
information how Jordan identifies and wants to be identified by other countries, the 
Jordanians appear to be motivated to at once demonstrate a) their nonproliferation 
credentials to international audiences and b) their prioritization of nuclear sovereignty 
above all else to domestic and regional audiences.  For instance, in 2007, Jordan became 
a member of the “Global Nuclear Energy Partnership,” a Bush Administration initiative 
to “encourage nuclear cooperation while restraining the spread of enrichment and 
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reprocessing capabilities.” Moreover, in 2008, Jordan signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the United States under which it agreed not to pursue indigenous 
uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing.
114
  At the same time, Jordanian officials, 
on numerous occasions, have publicly denounced the NCA terms. In 2010, Jordan 
Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) Chairman, Khaled Toukan, said, “We believe in the 
universality of the NPT. Jordan does not agree on applying conditions and restrictions 
outside of the NPT on a regional basis or a country-by-country basis.”
115
  Ultimately, 
Toukan’s statements appear to be genuine and add weight to the contention that Jordan is 
unwilling to change the international nonproliferation regime in a way that would require 
it to give up its sovereignty. 
Alternative explanations 
Domestic political influence 
 In 2011, State Department official Richard Stratford predicted, “Once the cabinet 
is reformed and things have settled down...I think we will be able to conclude the 
negotiation swiftly and Congress will be pleased when they see the outcome.”  This and 
other similiar comments appeared to indicate Jordanian officials wanted to avoid signing 
a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States that would allow domestic 
political opposition to seize on Jordan’s “pro-Western” inclinations as one of many 
challenges to the King’s legitimacy.  However, while Jordan does face opposition over 
several aspects of the program – whether site-specific, environmental, or financial 
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 – there is also softening support for Jordan’s nuclear program among its most 
stringent opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood.
117
 Jordanian officials themselves may 
appear to be attempting to quell the opposition with statements such as that by the 
JAEC’s Khaled Toukan that Jordan “will not agree to sign any agreement that infringes 
on our sovereign rights or our international rights under any treaties.”
118
 However, the 
quote may indicate nothing more than a Jordanian official’s desire to move forward with 
the nuclear program as seamlessly as possible, even (or especially) if that means stoking 
nationalist sentiments. Indeed, as Tobin argues, the Arab Spring-like protests were never 
a great threat to the status quo in Jordan. That is, Jordan’s leaders were able to quell the 
opposition by providing cosmetic electoral reforms, real financial relief, and a sense that 
one only need look to neighboring Iraq to see that Jordan without King Abdullah would 
be much worse off than with him.
119
  Given the reality on the ground currently in Jordan, 
where domestic opposition to the program itself is diffuse but limited, where Jordan 
appears in little danger of a revolution, and where Jordan has taken pro-Western 
decisions without regard to its opposition – such as allowing 200 American troops to be 
stationed near the Jordanian-Syrian border 
120
 -- the argument that domestic politics is the 
driving force behind its NCA decision is less persuasive.   
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External security concerns 
 Another hypothesis the paper considered is that Jordan is maintaining the option 
to develop sensitive fuel cycle technologies so that it may one day develop nuclear 
weapons to counter regional threats from Israel and/or Iran. For instance, one observers 
states, “Given Israel’s military nuclear capability, there are clear geopolitical reasons why 
Jordan would be unwilling to forego the option of developing dual-purpose 
technologies…”
121
 Following a 2007 interview with the Israeli newspaper Haaretz in 
which Jordanian King Abdullah II said “after this summer, everybody’s going for nuclear 
programs,” (including the Jordanians)
122
 and “the rules governing the nuclear issue have 
changed in the entire region,”
123
 an Israeli observer suggested that Jordan was simply 
reacting to the threat of a nuclearized Iran.
124
  During that time international efforts to 
prevent Iran from enriching uranium were faltering and many were worried about Iran’s 
influence in the region as the U.S. was stuck in the Afghan and Iraq wars.
125
 
 While one can never discount Jordan’s potential intentions, there are two main 
reasons it is unlikely that Jordan’s logic is related to external security concerns. First, 
Jordan has long demonstrated peaceful regional intentions, not only as one of two nations 
with a peace treaty with Israel, but also as a broker for Israeli-Palestinian peace 
                                                 
121 Steve Thomas, Global Insider 
 
122 Akiva Eldar, “King Abdullah to Haaretz: Jordan aims to develop nuclear power,” Haaretz, January 19, 2007, 2007 http://www.haaretz.com/news/king-abdullah-
to-haaretz-jordan-aims-to-develop-nuclear-power-1.210546 (accessed May 20, 2013). 
 








negotiations. Second, Jordan has strong nonproliferation “bona fides.”
126
 It is party to all 
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements, including the voluntary 
“additional protocol,” is a strong supporter of a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone, 
and is a participant in global nonproliferation initiatives, such as GNEP.  
Conclusion 
 This section argues that Jordan has decided not to sign an NCA with the United 
States because it would require Jordan to give up its sovereign right to develop and 
exploit its uranium reserves.  Because Jordan does not have many options to finance the 
program, disallowing the possibility of indigenous enrichment would undermine the 
program’s rationale. That is, without this option, Jordan would need to find a different 
way to become more economically autonomous and therefore, ultimately gain relative 
power– given all of the challenges the program faces, it would not make economic sense 
to move forward.  Contrary to expectations, Jordan’s alliance with the United States does 
not provide enough incentive to sign the NCA.  However, an area for further research 
would be to what extent the United States is actively pursuing the conclusion of the 
agreement.  
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Chapter Four: Policy implications and recommendations 
Overview 
 This paper attempted to answer the research question: what motivates states to 
sign nuclear cooperation agreements (NCA) with the United States that would require 
them to give up rights to enrich uranium and reprocess spent fuel? The question itself is 
driven by a desire to understand how the international community could mobilize support 
for an internationalized nuclear fuel cycle – that is, an arrangement where states would 
give up sovereign authority over the production of civil nuclear fuel for domestic power 
use.  Using a most similar systems design, I examined the cases of Jordan and the United 
Arab Emirates in their nuclear cooperation with the United States. Jordan has not agreed 
to terms of a U.S. NCA while the UAE has. The cases provided an interesting puzzle 
because they represented the reverse of the expected outcome: given that the U.S. has 
greater leverage over Jordan than the UAE, it was puzzling that Jordan has not signed.  
 I found that Jordan and the UAE were motivated by their desires to gain or 
maintain their relative power within the international system. Jordan, as a developing 
state, has less leverage over the terms of international economic exchange than the UAE, 
which as a member of OPEC, is among the wealthiest countries on the planet. Jordan is 
thus more compelled to engage in trade that would further its economic independence. 
Given Jordan’s ability to finance its nuclear program, signing an NCA with the United 
States would ultimately keep it in the same relative power position.  
46 
 
 Jordan, ultimately, has not agreed to the terms of the U.S. NCA because it has 
natural uranium reserves that it wishes to exploit. While Jordan had hinted that it might 
be willing to give up its fuel cycle rights, I argue that the terms of the NCA would need to 
be much more accommodative to Jordan’s economic position. While a U.S. government 
official has stated that the U.S. may be willing to change the terms of the agreement so 
that Jordan’s enrichment and reprocessing prohibition would last for only 10 years, after 
which time the contract could be renegotiated,
127
 two factors are probably obstructing 
even this more relaxed deal from moving forward: first, the U.S. Congress, where the 
Gold Standard approach appears to be one of few issues enjoying bipartisan support; 
second, Jordan’s unwillingness to risk the difficulty of 10 years hence renegotiating 
conditions of an agreement that it has very little incentive to make in the first place, given 
its options for nuclear cooperation with other nuclear suppliers.   
 The United Arab Emirates, with its enormous wealth, could make a different 
strategic calculation. The country recognized its long-term economic interests were at 
stake not only because its oil and gas reserves may one day expire, but also because its 
growing energy demand would strain the country’s ability to provide its citizens rents 
vis-à-vis employment, subsidies, and outright bribes. Nuclear energy provides a way to 
prolong the country’s “ruling bargain;” thus, to overcome international consternation 
over the UAE’s history of proliferation laxity, the country adopted a strategy that would 
demonstrate the program’s singularly peaceful purposes. When it came time to negotiate 
                                                 




terms for and sign the NCA
128
, the UAE needed to oblige the U.S. terms; if they had not, 
they would not have been able to receive nuclear transfers from any of the three consortia 
from whom they had solicited tenders.   
 The nuclear renaissance and nonproliferation  
 A primary motivation for undertaking this study was to understand why states 
would agree to an internationalized nuclear fuel cycle arrangement, as has been proposed 
by a number of actors including the International Atomic Energy Agency.
129
 In order to 
do so, it is important to understand better the challenges facing the nonproliferation 
regime and why such an arrangement is important.   
 As has been noted, the control of nuclear trade is shifting from a small, 
concentrated number of states to larger group. A shift in the market is corresponding with 
what some have termed a nuclear “renaissance.”
130
 Whereas nuclear power was once the 
purview of the developed world, increases in energy demand and recognition of the 
climate change effects from traditional fossil fuels has led existing and new nuclear states 
alike to look more closely at meeting their energy needs with nuclear. As of March 2013, 
there were 66 new nuclear reactors under construction, 160 on order or planned for 
operation by 2030, and another 319 proposed for operation by 2030.  Of the new reactors 
under construction, only one is in a country with no nuclear power capacity – the UAE.  
Of the 160 planned reactors, 30 come from new nuclear states, and of the 319 proposed, 
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67 come from new nuclear states.
131
 Most of the new nuclear capacity will emanate from 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia. While some of these states have already made 
commitments not to develop enrichment and reprocessing facilities, many have not, 
including Jordan and Vietnam. Moreover, influential rising powers such as South Africa 
and Brazil have not endorsed proposals to adopt a multilateral approach to the nuclear 
fuel cycle (where implicitly states would forgo full fuel cycle development), reflecting 
“their lingering distrust of the major powers and a determination to exercise full 
sovereignty in developing the capability to produce nuclear energy.”
132
  Such a response 
by these countries, it should be noted, is consistent with the argument I have made 
regarding states’ ultimate interest in controlling the means of economic production and 
distribution within the international system. 
 While the United States has responded by introducing more stringent proliferation 
measures in its bilateral cooperation agreements, the rest of the nuclear suppliers are 
more hesitant to make nuclear trade contingent on fuel cycle restrictions. For instance, 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) opposed a Bush Administration proposal to allow the 
sale of reprocessing equipment and technologies to only those states already in 
possession of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Importantly, the proposal would 
have placed restrictions directly on NSG members themselves and ultimately was 
rejected. Non nuclear weapons states also opposed the proposal because it further 
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perpetuated discrimination in the NPT regime.
133
 Some states, including advanced 




 The question for nonproliferation today is the same as the one Eisenhower had in 
trying to promote Atoms For Peace: how to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons while 
promoting nuclear energy. One factor, arguably, provides a greater incentive for 
cooperation: the threat of terrorist organizations gaining access to the necessary materials 
and technology to a build primitive, and one day more advanced, nuclear devices.
135
  
While such a scenario is likely far off, globalization has changed the international 
economy, as demonstrated by Pakistani scientist, AQ Khan’s vast transnational nuclear 
supply network, which assisted in enabling new nuclear states such as North Korea, 
Libya, and Iran.
136
  There are growing concerns that even with the exposure of Khan’s 
network, globalization has facilitated the emergence of parallel global economies.  
Implications 
 Different trajectories to meet the challenges to the nonproliferation regime include 
continuing the path of bilateral cooperation while relying on a patchwork nuclear export 
regime, harmonize the export control regime, or internationalizing the fuel cycle. The 
first and third options appear more likely than the second in that the first would maintain 
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the status quo and the third would require consensus by all regime players, not just 
suppliers -- whose reform efforts have been met with rebuke within and outside of the 
NSG. Thus, these two options will be assessed based on the findings of this study.  I 
support internationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle in light of the growing strain on the 
nonproliferation regime. 
A. The Gold Standard vs. case-by-case debate within the U.S. 
 In view of the fact that there is no near-term effort to create a new international 
nuclear fuel agency, it is important to understand the U.S. policy debate surrounding 
nuclear trade.  Lawmakers, academics, and policy influencers disagree over whether the 
U.S. should be pushing for the Gold Standard – i.e. the approach of the U.S.-UAE NCA. 
In 2012, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, one of the relevant oversight 
committees responsible for approving NCAs reported a bill out of its committee that, 
among other things, would prohibit that the United States from engaging in nuclear trade 
without an agreement similar to that with the UAE, unless Congress did not adopt a joint 
resolution of disapproval within 60 days of its signing.
137
 The bill was intended to create 
a higher standard than currently exists for approving nuclear trade with other countries. 
 Within the Obama Administration itself, the debate regarding the best course of 
action continues. As reported by the online magazine Foreign Policy, there are two 
camps within the administration: for the most part, the State department backs the 
implementation of the Gold Standard while the Department of Energy does not.
138
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However, even within the State Department, there have been mixed signals. In the 
beginning of 2012, the State Department sent a letter to Congress stating that the U.S. 
would negotiate NCAs on a case-by-case basis. Then, it was reported the then-Secretary 
of State, Hilary Clinton, was reexamining this decision.
139
      
 Outside of Congress and the Administration, prominent voices from different 
ideological positions have suggested that the United States should not squander the 
victory of the UAE agreement by allowing other countries, particularly those in the 
Middle East, to enrich and reprocess.  Henry Sokolski of the right-leaning 
Nonproliferation Education Policy Center, has argued that with the State Department 
letter, President Obama is going back on the example he set in Prague, in 2009, when he 
made a major speech calling for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. Sokolski 
also suggested that the tradeoff between having leverage in the nonproliferation regime 
and engaging in nuclear trade was a false choice because of the miniscule amount of 
direct trade the U.S. does overseas. Rather, he suggested that the United States has 
leverage only with regard to nuclear suppliers that wish to do business within the United 
States: should they wish to engage in commerce within the United States, the U.S. should 
insist that they abide by a stricter supply criteria, similar to that of the UAE NCA 
provisions.
140
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 Joseph Cirincione, President of the liberal zero nuclear weapons movement 
foundation, Ploughshares Fund, has argued that allowing any nuclear trade in the Middle 
East would necessarily lead to a Middle East arms race. He suggested that the case-by-
case approach is a mistake because it inserts politics into nuclear trade. Enemies do not 
get to trade with the United States while allies are “rewarded” with favorable treatment – 
as evidenced by the U.S.-India nuclear deal that allowed India to reprocess spent U.S.-
origin nuclear fuel for civilian production even though doing so would be expressly 
against stated U.S. policy and the agreed-policy of the NSG regarding non-States parties 
to the NPT. 
 On the other side of the debate, former state department officials have vehemently 
argued against the Gold Standard policy.
141
 I adhere closer to these points-of-view, based 
on the findings of the study. It seems as though some of the Gold Standard proponents 
have missed the forest for the trees. They may have valid arguments if there were no such 
thing as the NPT and Article IV inalienable rights to the full nuclear fuel cycle. This 
norm appears to be very strong for countries, like Jordan, that are part of the developing 
world and also would see a tangible material benefit from maintaining its fuel cycle 
options, should its uranium prove commercially feasible. As Fred McGoldrick argues 
with regard to the Gold Standard, the United States should heed this advice: “Look over 
your shoulder now and then to be sure someone’s following you.”
142
 If, as Sokolski 
suggests, the United States doesn’t have skin in the international nuclear trade industry, 
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then it certainly makes little sense for it to insist on a policy that would make doing 
business with the United States even harder, especially when “other major suppliers are 
simply not going to impose the UAE model on their cooperating partners.”
143
   
B. Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
 As a 2005 IAEA study found, there are potential economic and obvious 
nonproliferation benefits to adopting an international nuclear fuel cycle approach. 
Regional supply centers, for instance, could “provide the benefits of cost-effectiveness 
and economies of scale for whole regions, or smaller countries or for those with limited 
resources.” Moreover, the study found that such an approach “can provide enhanced 
assurance to the partners and to the international community that the most sensitive parts 
of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle are less vulnerable to misuse for weapon purposes.”
144
  
Yet, given the difficulty for the United States to persuade even its closest allies to agree 
on giving up sovereignty on nuclear fuel cycle rights, I argue that the internationalization 
of the nuclear fuel cycle must be a truly international effort. The case of Jordan has 
shown that states will not easily relinquish their Article IV NPT rights.
145
 There is a way 
to make any new internationalized fuel cycle approach voluntary but still effective, as the 
NPT itself has demonstrated.  The key would be providing not only for states to reap the 
benefits they would if they were to develop a fuel cycle indigenously, but also for an “out 
clause” for states whose sovereign rights are legitimately being violated. 
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 There are three main areas where the forgoing study may have been improved. 
First, additional sets of dyads that allow for similar comparison would provide greater 
weight to the conclusions here. Second, there was a disappointing amount of detail 
regarding the UAE’s decision on nuclear cooperation with the U.S. Particularly, given 
that the UAE hired most American lobbyists to assist with strategy for civilian nuclear 
energy development, it was hard to discern where motivations bled into public relations 
“speak”. In a related way, this study could have benefited from a closer examination of 
the UAE’s engagement of lobbyists as a driver of its nuclear cooperation choices in 
contrast with Jordan’s strategy. Finally, it was also difficult to gauge U.S. involvement in 
these deals. For instance, I would have liked to find out how much pressure did the U.S. 
put on the UAE vs. Jordan. Even after an interview with a current government official, 
the answer to this question was not any clearer. 
Conclusion   
 This study provides an initial approach to analyzing states’ decisions within one 
aspect of the nuclear nonproliferation regime – the nuclear fuel cycle.  It reinforced what 
some longtime policymakers have known, states are sensitive to their Article IV rights. 
Using a Realist lens, I found that Jordan and the UAE made decisions based on their 
desire for relative economic gains. The international nonproliferation regime facilitates 
an equal playing field because players in the regime agree to its principles and norms. As 
a result, Jordan is able to resist pressure from the U.S. to sign an agreement that Jordan 
does not find favorable. If the global nonproliferation community, including U.S. 
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policymakers, wish to adopt a multilateral nuclear fuel cycle approach, this study finds 
they would be wise to work within the confines of the NPT’s basic tenet: in the area of 





al Suwaidi, Abdulah “The United Arab Emirates at 40: A Balance Sheet,” Middle East 
Policy, 28, No. 4, (Winter 2011): 44-58. 
 
Araj, Kamal J.,“Plan for the establishment and development of the NPP owner/operator 
organization,” power point presentation to IAEA meeting, October 2012, slides 2 
and 3, www.iaea.org/...10.../09.Plan_for_NPP_Operator_Araj_Jordan.pdf 
(accessed on May 25, 2013). 
 
bin Zayeh Al Nahyan, Abdullah; Araj, Kamal J.; Fahmy, Nabil and Chongkum, 
Somporn, “Why Go Nuclear,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 64, no. 14 (Sept. 
2009).  
 
Banks, John P. and Ebinger, Charles K., “Introduction: Planning a Responsible Nuclear 
Energy Future” in Business and Nonproliferation, eds. John P. Banks and Charles 
Ebinger, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1-14  
 
Barwig, Andrew, “The ‘New Palace Guards:’ Elections and Elites in Morocco and 
Jordan,” The Middle East Journal, 66, No. 3 (Summer 2012), 425-439. 
 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation: How and With 
Whom?,” Transcript by Federal News Service, Washington, D.C., March 29, 
2011 
 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Nuclear Energy Brief: Negotiating 
Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” by Mark Hibbs August 7, 2012,  
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/07/negotiating-nuclear-cooperation-
agreements/d98z (accessed April 25, 2013).  
 
Cirincione, Joseph, Bomb Scare, New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007. 
 
Cirincione, Joseph, “Chain Reaction: How a U.S.-UAE arms deal could set off a Middle 
East Arms Race” foreignpolicy.com, May 7, 2009. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/05/06/chain_reaction (accessed June 
3, 2013). 
 
Corera, Gordon, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the 
Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Cortright, David and Vayrynen, Raimo, Towards Nuclear Zero, London: International 




Cocker, Margaret and Solomon, Jay, “Oil-Rich Arab State Pushes Nuclear Bid With U.S. 
Help,” Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123862439816779973.html, (accessed June 3, 
2013). 
 
Davidson, Christopher M., “After Shaikh Zayed: The Politics of Succession in Abu 
Dhabi and the UAE,” Middle East Policy, 12, no, 1 (Spring 2006): 42-59. 
 
Davidson, Christopher M. “Yes, the Gulf monarchs are in trouble” Foreignpolicy.com, 
November 13, 2012, 
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/13/gulf_autocracy_in_question 
(accessed June 4, 2013). 
 
Dyer, Geoff and Reed, John, “Jordan close to commissioning two nuclear reactors, 
declines to sign accord with U.S.” The Financial Times, March 6, 2013.  
 
Early, Bryan R., “Acquiring Foreign Nuclear Assistance in the Middle East,” The 
Nonproliferation Review, 17, no. 2 (June 2010): 259-280, 260 
 
Ebinger, Charles and Squassoni, Sharon, “Industry and Emerging Nuclear Markets” in 
Business and Nonproliferation, edited by John P. Banks and Charles Ebinger, 66-
118, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011. 
 
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan  and Wright, Steven, “Political change in the Arab oil 
monarchies,” International Affairs 83, no. 5 (2007) 913-932 
 
Eldar, Akiva  “King Abdullah to Haaretz: Jordan aims to develop nuclear power,” 
Haaretz, January 19, 2007 http://www.haaretz.com/news/king-abdullah-to-
haaretz-jordan-aims-to-develop-nuclear-power-1.210546 (accessed May 20, 
2013). 
 
EIU ViewsWire, “UAE economy: Nuclear bargain,” Economist Intelligence Unit, Dec. 
29, 2009. 
 
Frantz, Erica and Ezrow, Natasha, The Politics of Dictatorship: Institutions and 
Outcomes in Authoritarian Regimes, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2011. 
 
Gilpin, Robert, The Political Economy of International Relations, New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., 1975. 
 
Fuhrmann, Matthew, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear 




Hibbs, Mark, “Jordan Holding off on agreeing to terms for cooperation with US” 
Nucleonics Week, May 7, 2009. 
 
Hofp, Ted,“The Promise of Constructivism,” International Security, 23, No. 1, (Summer 
1998): 171-200. 
 
International Atomic Energy Agency Information Circular 640, “Multilateral Approaches 
to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report submitted to the Director General 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency,” February 22, 2005. 
 
Jackson, Ian “Nuclear Energy and Proliferation Risks: myths and realities in the Persian 
Gulf,” International Affairs, 85, no. 6 (2009): 1157-1172. 
 
Jervis, Robert, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” 
International Security, 24, no. 1(1999) 42-63, 43-44 
 
“Jordanian Islamists to reconsider position on nuclear reactor” BBC Monitoring 
International Reports, Feb. 21, 2013. 
 
Kane, Chen, “US nuclear cooperation agreements and the Middle East,” Arms Control 
and Regional Security For the Middle East Blog, entry posted on August 3, 2012,  
http://www.middleeast-armscontrol.com/2012/08/03/us-nuclear-cooperation-
agreements-and-the-middle-east/ (accessed May 14, 2013) (2012 A). 
 
Kane, Chen “Jordan’s Nuclear Energy Program,” (unpublished report, James L. Martin 
Center for Nonproliferation, August 2012) (2012 B). 
 
“KEPCO wins UAE civil nuclear bid,” Nuclear Engineering International, (Feb 2010).  
 
Krasner, Stephen Structural Conflict, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 287-290.  
 
Lake, David A.  “Power and the Third World: Toward a Realist Political Economy of 
North-South Relations,” International Studies Quarterly, 31, No. 2 (Jun.,1987) 
217-234. 
 
Luck, Taylor,  “Jordan, AREVA, part ways over uranium mining,” Jordan Times, 
October 24, 2012. 
 
MacFarlane, Allison, “Where, How, and Why Will Nuclear Happen? Nuclear 
‘Renaissance’ Discourses from Buyers and Suppliers,” in Nuclear Renaissance 
and International Security, edited by Adam Stulberg and Matthew Furhmann 50-




McGoldrick, Fred, The U.S.-UAE Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: A Gold 
Standard or Fools Gold?, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, November 30, 2010.  
 
Naim, Moises, Illicit, New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2005, Chapter 3. 
 
“New uranium mining projects -Jordan” http://www.wise-uranium.org/upjo.html, 
October 24, 2012 (accessed June 2, 2013). 
 
 
Rogin, Josh, “Is the Obama administration retreating from its nuclear non-proliferation 
promise?” Foreign Policy. 
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/07/is_the_obama_administration
_retreating_from_its_nuclear_non_proliferation_promise, October 7, 2010 
(accessed on May 29, 2013). 
 
Rublee, Maria, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens, 
Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 2009).   
 
Rugh, William, “The foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates” The Middle East 
Journal, 50, no.1, (Winter 1996): 57-70. 
 
Setrakian, Lara  “In Abu Dhabi’s ‘Formula,’ a fast force for change,” foreignpolicy.com, 
November 19, 2010, 
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/19/in_abu_dhabis_formula_a_fast
_force_for_change (accessed June 4, 2013). 
 
Seward, Amy; Mathews, Carrie; and Kessler, Carol, “Evaluating Nonproliferation ‘Bona 
Fides’ in Nuclear safeguards, security, and nonproliferation: achieving security 
with technology and policy edited by James Doyle, 265-283, Amsterdam; Boston: 
Elsevier/Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008. 
 
Sim, Li-Chen, “Re-branding Abu Dhabi: From oil giant to energy titan,” Place Branding 
and Public Diplomacy, 8, no. 1, (Oct. 2011) 83-98. 
 
Sokolski, Henry, “Obama’s Nuclear Mistake,” The National Review Online 
http://www.nationalreview.com/content/obama%E2%80%99s-nuclear-
mistake/page/0/1, February 7, 2012 (accessed May 29, 2013). 
 
Squassoni, Sharon, “Mapping Nuclear Power’s Future Spread” in Nuclear Power’s 
Global Expansion: Weighing It’s Costs and Risks, edited by Henry Sokolski, 53-




Stulberg, Adam, “Confronting the Credible Commitment Problem,” in Nuclear 
Renaissance and International Security, edited by Adam Stulberg and Matthew 
Furhmann, 97-123. Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2013.  
 
Tobin, Sarah A., “Jordan’s Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution” Middle 
East Policy, 19, no.1, (Spring 2013): 96-109. 
 
“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” April 22, 1970, The International 
Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC 140 (1970)  
 
“UAE set nuclear precedent of ‘Gold Standards’” The National, accessed from UAE 
Interact, August 8, 2010, (Accessed April 26, 2013).  
 
United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Policy of the United Arab Emirates 
on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy,” April 
2008, www.fanr.gov.ae/En/Documents/whitepaper.pdf, (accessed June 4, 2013). 
 
 
U.S. Library of Congress, CRS, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by 
Mary Beth Nikitin and Paul Kerr, CRS Report RS22937. Washington, DC: Office 
of Congressional Information and Publishing, June 19, 2012. 
 
U.S. Library of Congress, CRS, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy 
Sharp CRS Report RL33546, Washington, DC: Office of Congressional 
Information and Publishing, April 9, 2010. 
 
U.S. Library of Congress, CRS, Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle by Anthony Andrews, 
Mark Holt, and Mary Beth Nitikin, CRS Report RL34234. Washington, DC: 
Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, Oct. 19, 2012. 
 
U.S. Library of Congress, CRS, The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy, 
by 2010 Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report, Washington, DC: Office of 
Congressional Information and Publishing, RS21852, March 18, 2013. 
 
U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, “Milestones: (1945-1952) 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/BaruchPlans (accessed October 15, 
2013). 
 
Varnum, Jessica, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation as Nonproliferation: Reforms, or the Devil 
You Know?” Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Institute, (November 27, 2012). 
http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/us-nuclear-cooperation-nonproliferation-




Wendt, Alexander, “Anarchy is what states make of it: the Social Construction of Power 
Politics,” International Organization, 46, No. 3, (Spring 1992): 391-425. 
 
Whitman, Elizabeth, “Protesters March in Jordan Against Deployment of US Troops” Al 
Monitor, April 26, 2013, http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/jordan-protests-us-troops-syria-chemical-
weapons.html (accessed May 25, 2013). 
  
World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Jordan,” updated October 2012, 
http://world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-
N/Jordan/#.UfP7kz5gZ68, (accessed April 20, 2012). 
 
World Nuclear Association, “World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements” 
http://world-nuclear.org/info/Facts-and-Figures/World-Nuclear-Power-Reactors-
and-Uranium-Requirements/#.UfQGND5gZ69, (accessed June 1, 2013). 
 
Yager, Joseph A., International Cooperation in Nuclear Energy, Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1981. 
 
 
